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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND UNWARRANTED GPS
SURVEILLANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS’ DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. MAYNARD

INTRODUCTION
In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases to deal with modern technology
and its implications on the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Justice Brandeis expounded the Framers’ purpose behind
adopting the Amendment in his famous dissent, stating:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. . . . They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
1
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Modern day advances in technology have pushed the limits of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection, challenging courts to face these limits head on. The
conflict between the public interest in protecting citizens against criminal
activity and the preciousness of individual privacy has come to a head in cases
involving electronic surveillance.2 In United States v. Maynard, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether the warrantless use of a
global positioning system (hereinafter “GPS”) tracking device on a criminal
suspect’s car for a month long period of time constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, whether or not this was a
violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights.3 The D.C. Circuit Court
distinguished its case from relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence4 and
numerous other circuits5 by holding that the tracking did constitute a search
and violated the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy.6

1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Renee M. Pomerance, Redefining Privacy in the Face of New Technologies: Data
Mining and the Threat to the “Inviolate Personality,” 9 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 277 (2005).
3. 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
4. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
5. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez,
605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17
(9th Cir. 2010).
6. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–65. This Article was written prior to the Supreme Court’s
grant of certiorari The United States Supreme Court granted certiori on June 27, 2011. Maynard,
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This Note explores the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and the recent circuit split regarding warrantless use of GPS devices. The first
section of this paper lays out the relevant precedent on Fourth Amendment
searches with respect to the Maynard decision. The second section explores
decisions by circuit courts that have found that the warrantless use of GPS
trackers does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The third section of this Note explains the D.C. Circuit Court’s
analysis and decision in Maynard. This Note concludes by analyzing Maynard
and discusses the reasons why the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Maynard was
correct.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A.

The General Framework of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens from
unwanted governmental intrusions.7 It grants people the right to be free from
governmental intrusion and to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”8 The usual principal
inquiry when the Fourth Amendment is implicated is whether or not the
governmental action constituted a search.9
If an action amounts to a search, then the Fourth Amendment requires that
search to be reasonable in order to be constitutionally valid.10 What is
reasonable depends on the context within which the search takes place.11 Once
it is established that a search has occurred, a search conducted without a
warrant is “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only

615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064
(2011). Oral arguments took place on November 8, 2011. United States v. Jones, 2011 WL
5360051. The Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones on January 23, 2012. United States
v. Jones, 2012 WL 171117. All nine Justices concluded that a search occurred in Jones. Id.
Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan agreed that Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy
was violated. Id. at *17 (Alito, J., concurring).
7. There is debate over whether the Court or Congress is better suited to police technology
enhanced searches. See Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search: Intrusiveness and
the Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1189 n.22 (2010). For the purposes of this
Article, I will only explore the Court’s regulation of searches.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment, in full, provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
9. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
10. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
11. Id.
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to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”12 Warrants
are required to protect individuals from the harms the Fourth Amendment was
meant to protect against and as a practical measure, to force police to make a
record before a search rather than allowing them to conduct a search without
prior investigation or without oversight from a neutral judicial magistrate.13 If
police obtain evidence from a warrantless search, any such evidence may be
excluded later at the defendant’s criminal trial.14 Therefore, defining certain
police actions as searches “yields significant implications for police
investigative techniques and procedure, as well as the conduct of any resulting
criminal trial.”15
The presumption for requiring a warrant, however, does not even come
into play unless there is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, so the most pertinent issue when beginning the Fourth
Amendment analysis is whether or not an action constitutes a search.16 A
search occurs when a governmental intrusion infringes on an individual’s
legitimate expectation of privacy.17 That expectation of privacy must be one
which society considers reasonable.18 In other words, a legitimate expectation
of privacy must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment, such as an
understanding that is recognized or permitted by society.19
B.

Defining a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

In United States v. Katz, the United States Supreme Court overruled
Olmstead v. United States20 and held that the reach of the Fourth Amendment

12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). As Justice Thomas
recognized in his dissent in Groh v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court has “vacillated between
imposing a categorical warrant requirement and applying a general reasonableness standard.”
540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). He listed some of the common exceptions to
the warrant requirement in his dissent and highlighted the debate among Supreme Court Justices
as to whether there actually is a warrant requirement or whether the Fourth Amendment merely
requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, and obtaining a warrant is a factor in that
analysis. Id. at 571–72.
13. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Evidence may not be excluded if it was
obtained in a manner which satisfies an exception to the warrant requirement. See Ramirez, 540
U.S. at 571–72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C.
L. REV. 661, 671 (2005).
16. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 n.22 (1984).
20. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the interception of private telephone
conversations by means of wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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does not turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.21 Rather, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.22 The Court explained this, saying, “[w]herever a
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.”23 In Katz, the government was permitted to introduce
evidence at trial of the defendant’s telephone conversations in a public phone
booth, which had been taped by FBI agents.24 The Court emphasized that
these calls occurred in the public sphere, stating, “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not the subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”25 The Court did state that there may be some
privacy and Fourth Amendment protection when a defendant sought to
preserve something as private, even in an area accessible to the public.26 For
instance, the defendant did not lose his right to exclude the uninvited ear
simply because he placed his telephone call from a public place, and the Court
stressed that to read the Constitution more narrowly “is to ignore the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”27
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan elaborated on the Court’s explanation,
laying out the seminal test for what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy.28 The application of the Fourth Amendment depends, at the outset, on
whether or not the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable,
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by
government action.29 Justice Harlan split this inquiry into two parts.30 First,
courts must determine whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an
actual subjective expectation of privacy;31 that is, whether the individual has
shown that he seeks to preserve something as private.32 Second, the test

21. 389 U.S. at 353 (1967).
22. Id. at 351.
23. Id. at 359.
24. Id. at 348.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 351–52.
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
28. Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 361. Justice Harlan believed that when a person makes a phone call from a public
phone booth, that booth becomes a “temporarily private place” that can be intruded on by
eavesdropping. Id. (“The critical fact in this case is that ‘[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone
booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume’ that his conversation is not being intercepted. The point is not that the booth
is ‘accessible to the public’ at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose
momentary occupant’s expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”
(citations omitted)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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requires an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy to be one that
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” and is justifiable under the
circumstances.33 Therefore, the two prongs create both subjective and
objective elements of the test for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
C. Expectations of Privacy in the Public Sector
1. United States v. Knotts and Technological Enhancement of
Surveillance Powers
In the 1983 decision United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court applied
Katz in holding that the use of a beeper device to track a vehicle was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, was not a
violation of the criminal suspect’s constitutional rights.34 In Knotts, a beeper
that transmitted periodic signals to a radio receiver was placed in a drum of
chemicals purchased by one of the suspect’s codefendants.35 The suspect was
under investigation for drug manufacturing.36 The drum was placed in the
suspect’s car, allowing police to follow the car and maintain contact, both by
visual surveillance and a monitor that received the beeper signals.37 Police
officers pursued the suspect’s car and at times lost the signal from the beeper,
but with the assistance of a monitoring device in a helicopter, they were able to
relocate it.38 Using the beeper, police obtained information on the location of
the chemicals during three days of surveillance at the suspect’s house.39
In its analysis, the Court first acknowledged the Katz test defining
reasonable expectation of privacy.40 The Court stated that the government
surveillance essentially amounted to following the automobile on public streets
and highways.41 The Court reasoned that because the surveillance took place
on public streets and highways, and, therefore, in the public sphere, there was a
diminished expectation of privacy.42
The Court relied on the 1974 decision Cardwell v. Lewis43 to articulate its
reasoning concerning the expectation of privacy on public streets.44 In
Cardwell, when deciding whether the examination of a car without a warrant

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 279.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280.
Id at 282.
Id. at 281.
417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
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violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Blackmun stated, “[o]ne has a lesser
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation . . . . It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and
its contents are in plain view.”45 The Knotts Court reasoned that someone
traveling in a car on public streets had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another.46 The fact that the police relied on
their own ability to follow his car and on the beeper’s signal to find the suspect
was immaterial to the Fourth Amendment claim.47 The Court famously stated
that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit scientific and technological
augmentation of the police’s natural sensory abilities.48
The Knotts Court articulated an important caveat relevant to the issue of
potential twenty-four hour surveillance.49 The respondent in Knotts argued
that the holding sought by the government would allow twenty-four hour
police surveillance of anyone in the country without judicial intervention or
oversight.50 The Court rejected that argument, disbelieving that result would
occur but stating that, “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then
to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”51
The Court ultimately held that the use of the beeper raised no constitutional
issues distinct from those raised with visual surveillance and there was no
search under the Fourth Amendment, as monitoring the beeper signals did not
invade a legitimate expectation of privacy.52
2. Kyllo v. United States and Exposure to the Public
A further modification to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence came in Kyllo v. United States.53 In Kyllo, the Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether the use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street, when the police suspected that defendant
was growing marijuana within the home, constituted a search of the home
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.54 The police scanned the
defendant’s home for several minutes to determine whether or not he was

45. 417 U.S. at 590 (plurality opinion).
46. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–83. The Court actually went even further than this, holding that
even once the car was off public streets and on the person’s private premises, there was no
expectation of privacy that extended to the visual surveillance of his car. Id. at 282.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 283–84.
50. Id. at 283.
51. Id. at 284.
52. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
53. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
54. Id. at 29. The thermal imaging device at issue detected heat and infra-red radiation. Id.
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growing marijuana.55 In its analysis of the case, the Court focused on the
defendant’s presence in the home at the time of the scan, stating that the right
to be free from governmental intrusion within one’s own home is at the core of
the Fourth Amendment.56 In prior cases, the Court had held that visual
surveillance was not a search at all;57 it stated that the case before it presented
more than just naked-eye surveillance.58 The Court articulated the issue as a
problem of ascertaining the limits upon the power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy.59 Advancements in technology have affected the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment, and the Court
stated it would “be foolish to contend” otherwise.60
The ultimate holding of Kyllo suggested that there are differing degrees of
permissible intrusion when it comes to technology. The Court stated that using
advanced technology to obtain any information from the inside of the home,
which could not have been obtained otherwise without a physical intrusion,
amounts to a search where the technology in question is not in general public
use.61 The technology used in Kyllo was not incredibly advanced, and the
Court made a point to account for more sophisticated systems that were in use
or development.62 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that where the
government used a device “that is not in general public use” to explore the
details of the home that otherwise would have required physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.63
II. ANALYZING UNWARRANTED USE OF GPS TRACKING: A LOOK AT
DIFFERING CIRCUITS
Circuit courts have been faced with the issue of whether or not warrantless
GPS tracking is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.64 A
considerable number have found that it is not.65

55. Id.
56. Id. at 31.
57. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1985) (holding that
enhanced aerial photography of a chemical plant by the Environmental Protection Agency,
without a warrant, was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
58. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id. at 33–34.
61. Id. at 34.
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id. at 40.
64. For the purposes of this Article, I will not be exploring the issue of the placement of GPS
devices on criminal suspects’ vehicles. A number of courts have analyzed the issue, including the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, where the court faced the
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Seventh Circuit

In United States v. Garcia, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue of whether
evidence obtained from a tracking device attached to defendant’s car should
have been excluded at trial as illegally obtained evidence.66 The defendant in
Garcia was found buying products to create methamphetamine.67 The police,
without a warrant, placed a GPS device underneath the rear bumper of his car,
allowing them to monitor the car’s travel history.68
In deciding that the use of the GPS did not constitute a search, the court
focused on the car’s presence in the public sphere when the police were
tracking it.69 The court pointed out that if the police followed a car on streets
or observed its route on “Google Earth,” there would be no search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.70 The court stated that GPS tracking was
the same, for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment search, as the police trying
to follow a car on a public street or by using cameras.71 However, the court
limited its holding by emphasizing that it would be unjustified for the police to
randomly affix GPS devices to cars to analyze suspicious driving patterns or to
pass a law requiring all cars to have GPS devices.72 “It would be premature to
rule that such a program of mass surveillance could not possibly raise a
question under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”73
The court acknowledged the implications of its holding and its potential
effect on an individual’s privacy, stating, “[t]here is a tradeoff between security
and privacy, and often it favors security.”74 The Seventh Circuit seemed to
suggest in its analysis, however, that the tradeoff could very well favor privacy
if the police actions went too far, for it ended its opinion stating, “[s]hould
government someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of
vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”75

issue of whether the placement of a GPS on the suspect’s vehicle undercarriage while on his
private property violated his constitutional rights. 591 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2010).
65. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all previously dealt with this issue. United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir.
2010); Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1212.
66. 474 F.3d at 995.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 997.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Seventh Circuit in the
decision to hold warrantless GPS tracking outside of the meaning of a Fourth
Amendment search.76 In United States v. Marquez, the Eighth Circuit found
that GPS devices placed on a suspect’s car did not violate a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.77 In Marquez, investigators observed the
defendant participating in a drug ring conspiracy and arrested him after
tracking his movements with a GPS device attached to his car and cameras set
up around the area.78 The defendant attempted to suppress the evidence
gathered from the GPS device.79 The district court denied the motion to
suppress, holding that the defendant had no standing to challenge the action
because he did not own the car to which the device was attached.80
Despite the district court’s determination at the outset that the defendant
had no standing to challenge the GPS surveillance, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals still engaged in an analysis of whether or not the action in question
constituted a search.81 The court held that even if the defendant had standing
to challenge the use of the GPS, he would have lost the challenge because his
reasonable expectation of privacy had not been violated.82 The court quoted
Knotts, emphasizing that a person traveling in a car on public streets has no
reasonable expectation of privacy, and no search occurs where electronic
monitoring does not invade a legitimate expectation of privacy.83 Like in
Kyllo, the court found that surveillance in the public sphere did not raise the
same concerns as warrantless electronic monitoring within a private
residence.84 In sum, the court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy
was thwarted because the police reasonably suspected that the vehicle was
involved in interstate transport of drugs, the vehicle was not tracked while in
private structures or on private lands, and the device merely allowed the police
to reduce the cost of lawful surveillance.85
C. Ninth Circuit
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the use of a GPS
device in tracking a drug criminal suspect’s car was not a search within the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id. at 609.
Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 609–10.
Id.
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, the failure to obtain a
warrant did not prevent the evidence gathered from being used at trial.86 In
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, drug enforcement agents observed Juan
Pineda-Moreno purchasing a large amount of a certain type of fertilizer, known
to be used in the growth of marijuana.87 The agents followed Pineda-Moreno
to his home, and after learning where he lived, they began attaching GPS
devices to his car.88 Over a four-month period, the agents attached tracking
devices to his vehicle on seven different occasions.89 Some of those devices
allowed the agents to access information regarding Pineda-Moreno’s
whereabouts from remote locations, while others required the agents to remove
the devices and download information directly.90 Law enforcement agents
eventually used the information from the GPS devices to track Pineda-Moreno
as he was leaving a marijuana growth site.91 They arrested him and charged
him with conspiracy to grow marijuana.92 When Pineda-Moreno moved to
suppress the evidence gained from the GPS tracker, his motion was denied.93
He appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.94
Pineda-Moreno argued on appeal that the use of mobile tracking devices to
monitor the location of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights because
the devices were not generally used by the public.95 Pineda-Moreno
acknowledged the Knotts holding but argued it should not be controlling
because of the court’s holding later holding in Kyllo regarding advances in
technological devices.96
Pineda-Moreno argued that police conduct a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment whenever they obtain information using senseenhancing technology not available to the general public.97 The court rejected
this argument, quoting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision that
Knotts established following a car on a public street was “unequivocally not a
search within the meaning of the amendment.”98 According to the Ninth
Circuit, Pineda-Moreno had misstated the relationship between Knotts and
86. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 1213.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1214.
92. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1216.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997
(7th Cir. 2007)). A prior section of this Article addresses the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in
Garcia. See supra Part II.A.
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Kyllo because he failed to understand the importance of the distinction between
the settings where the surveillance had taken place in those two cases.99 The
court stated that in Kyllo, the thermal imaging was a substitute for a search of
the home, which was unequivocally within the meaning of a Fourth
Amendment search, however, in Knotts, the substituted activity (following a
car) was outside the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.100 Distinguishing on
this point, the court stated that Pineda-Moreno failed to argue that the agents
used tracking devices to intrude into a constitutionally protected area, since
they were not intruding his home, and the information they collected could
have been obtained by following his car.101 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ultimately held that the use of mobile tracking devices by agents was
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.102
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S SPLIT IN UNITED STATES V. MAYNARD
A.

The D.C. Circuit’s Analysis of Warrantless GPS Tracking and Fourth
Amendment Searches

Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard owned and managed, respectively,
the “Levels” nightclub in the District of Columbia.103 In 2004, a local FBI task
force began investigating the two for narcotics violations.104 That investigation
culminated in searches, arrests, and charges for conspiracy to distribute and
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, among other things, on October
24, 2005.105 At a trial ending in January 2008, a jury found both men guilty.106
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Jones and Maynard jointly argued for five
points of error by the trial court.107 Jones also argued that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence gathered from the warrantless use of a GPS device to
track his movements continuously of a month.108 The prosecution’s evidence
gathered from the GPS device showed that Jones used his vehicle to store illicit

99. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
100. Id. The Court affords the highest constitutional protection to the inside of the home. See
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001) (stating that “in the sanctity of the home, all
details are intimate details”).
101. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
102. Id. at 1217. This case was subsequently denied for rehearing en banc, but a vigorous
dissent to that denial was filed by Judges Kozinski, Reinhardt, Wardlaw, Paez, and Berzon.
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121–26 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc).
103. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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drugs and money, transport money to his drug suppliers, and transport drugs.109
Jones argued that the warrantless use of GPS violated his Fourth Amendment
rights because it tracked his movements twenty-four hours a day for four
weeks, defeating his reasonable expectation of privacy.110 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit Court agreed with Jones and held that the continuous surveillance using
a GPS tracker without a warrant defeated his reasonable expectation of privacy
and was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.111
The court first considered the question of whether the use of GPS was a
search.112 The prosecution argued that United States v. Knotts was directly on
point because “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”113 The court disagreed.114 Straying from the Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits, it held that Knotts was not controlling.115 It reasoned that
Knotts did not control because Knotts dealt with more limited information
discovered through police use of a beeper, as opposed to the more
comprehensive, long-term GPS monitoring at issue.116 According to the D.C.
Circuit, the factors distinguishing the situation in Maynard from Knotts were
the amount and procedures of gathering the relevant information.117 The court
relied on the fact that the Knotts Court specifically distinguished between the
limited information discovered by the use of a beeper during discrete journeys
and more comprehensive, sustained monitoring using a device like a GPS.118
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit cited the Knotts Court’s reservation on the question
of whether a warrant would be required in a case involving “twenty-four hour
surveillance,” and its assertion that if such dragnet type law enforcement
practices should eventually occur, constitutional issues may be implicated.119
The court pointed to the recognition in Knotts that if a warrant was not
required, then prolonged “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.”120

109. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2006).
110. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555.
111. Id. at 555–56.
112. Id. at 555.
113. Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 556–58.
116. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 556–57.
120. Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.276, 283 (1983) (relying on the
defendant’s argument that the beeper surveillance should have defeated his reasonable
expectation of privacy)).
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The court held that Knotts actually had a more limited scope than other
circuits were willing to recognize.121 It emphasized that Knotts solely held that
there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s movements
from one place to another, not that the person had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements at all, or “world without end, as the Government
would have it.”122 The court distinguished its holding from the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Garcia because there the defendant’s challenge solely
raised the question of whether the warrantless tracking with a GPS in and of
itself violated the Fourth Amendment, without ever contending that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.123 The court rebuked the Seventh Circuit’s
use of Knotts to bless all tracking of cars on public streets and liken GPS
tracking to hypothetical practices it assumed were not searches, such as
satellite imaging.124
In addressing the other circuits, the D.C. Circuit Court also criticized the
Ninth Circuit for failing to distinguish between long and short-term
surveillance in Pineda-Moreno.125 It highlighted that the Seventh, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits, in holding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by
warrantless GPS tracking, each expressly reserved the issue of whether
“wholesale” or mass electronic surveillance requires a warrant.126 In addition,
the court cited other jurisdictions which have acknowledged Knotts’ limited
holding in relation to surveillance cases.127
In the court’s discussion supporting their finding that the GPS tracking
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy, it began with an application of the
Katz test and stated that the totality of Jones’ movements over the course of a
month was neither actually, nor constructively, exposed to the public.128 The
government contended Jones’ movements were actually exposed to the public
because the police lawfully could have followed him everywhere he went on
public roads.129 In the court’s view, the government had posed the wrong
question.130 The relevant question in considering whether something was
121. Id. at 557.
122. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that using
“Google Earth” to track a suspect would not be a search).
125. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557–58.
126. Id. at 558; see United States. v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010); Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.
127. Id. at 557; see also United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (“As
did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we pretermit any ruling on worst-case situations that may
involve persistent, extended, or unlimited violations of a warrant’s terms.”); People v. Weaver,
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1201 (N.Y. 2009).
128. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560–61.
129. Id. at 559.
130. Id.
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exposed to the public was not what another person can physically and may
lawfully do, but rather what a reasonable person expects another might actually
do.131 “[T]he whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not
actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all
those movements is effectively nil.”132
The court itself raised the issue of whether the whole of Jones’ movements
were constructively exposed to the public.133 “When it comes to privacy,
however, precedent suggests that the whole may be more revealing than the
parts.”134 All of Jones’ movements were not constructively exposed to the
public because, “like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more than the
individual movements it comprises.”135 The court made a bright distinction
between long-term and short-term surveillance when analyzing constructive
exposure and concluded that prolonged surveillance reveals more
It explained this proposition, stating that prolonged
information.136
surveillance can reveal intimate details about a person’s life, details not
otherwise exposed through limited surveillance.137 Prolonged surveillance can
enable the police to learn whether a suspect, for example, “is a weekly church
goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or
political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such
facts.”138
Of course, the finding that Jones’ actions were not exposed to the public
and that he had an expectation of privacy did not alone suffice; the court had to
find that Jones’ expectation of privacy was a reasonable one.139 The
prosecution argued that since Jones was in public, his expectation of privacy in
his movements was not reasonable.140 The court rejected this argument,
stating, “[a] person does not leave his privacy behind when he walks out his
front door.”141 It cited Katz for the proposition that actions which a person
131. Id.
132. Id. at 558.
133. Id. at 560–61.
134. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979)
(stating that there is an implicit distinction between the whole and the sum of the parts in the case
of the Fourth Amendment).
135. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62.
136. Id. at 562.
137. Id. The “intimate details” argument can be traced to Justice Stewart’s dissent in Smith,
where he stated that “such a list [of all the telephone numbers one called] . . . could easily
reveal . . . the most intimate details of a person’s life.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
138. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
139. Id. at 563.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.142 The court found there is a societal recognition of
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements over the course of a
month.143 It supported this finding by explaining that GPS monitoring
revealed intimate details of people’s lives and by citing various state laws,
which it called “indicative that prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an
expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable.”144 The court
further distinguished Knotts and backed its argument that Knotts’ limited
holding was not applicable to its case by pointing out the intrusion that such
prolonged GPS tracking makes into a subject’s private affairs “stands in stark
contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts.”145
The government criticized the court’s potential holding, arguing that the
effect would be to prohibit even visual surveillance of persons or vehicles
located in public places and exposed to public view.146 The court countered
this argument, stating that the government had not pointed to any actual
examples of visual surveillance that would be affected by their holding.147 The
court explained that practical considerations prevented visual surveillance from
lasting very long and the money and manpower required to simulate the results
of month long GPS tracking would be enormous, whereas GPS was relatively
affordable.148 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the introduction of
the GPS into police investigations had created an “unknown type of intrusion
into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”149 In sum, the court held that a
search without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable, the GPS tracking here
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and Jones’
conviction should be reversed because the evidence convicting him was
procured in violation of his constitutional rights.150
B.

Author’s Analysis of United States v. Maynard

The D.C. Circuit Court was correct in concluding that the warrantless GPS
tracking of Jones violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and was a

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64. The court cited various state codes that impose penalties
for the use of electronic tracking devices and expressly require exclusion of evidence obtained
from such devices unless the police procured a warrant prior to tracking. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 637.7 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, 77-24a-7, 77-24a-15.5 (West 2003);
MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.35, 626A.37 (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (2010).
145. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
146. Id. at 565.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 566, 568.
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search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.151 There are several
reasons why the analysis in Maynard is preferable to the analysis of the
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and why warrantless GPS tracking violates
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. First, in applying Knotts, the three
circuits erred in their failure to distinguish between prolonged and short-term
surveillance.152 The D.C. Circuit Court was correct to recognize that Knotts
had a limited holding.153 Second, Justice Harlan’s test for a reasonable
expectation of privacy in Katz that the majority in Maynard relied on has
evolved, now focusing more on the objective reasonable expectation of
privacy, instead of the subjective, and this has important implications for GPS
tracking cases.154 When focusing on an objective reasonable expectation to
privacy, it becomes obvious that society is coming to recognize an expectation
with regards to GPS tracking.155 Finally, the differences between the
rudimentary beeper technology used in Knotts and the GPS tracking
technology used in the later cases has an important impact on the Fourth
Amendment search analysis. The “substituting activities” argument made in
Pineda-Moreno and the other cases cannot stand when one considers the
practical impact of more advanced GPS technology.156
1. The Limited Holding of United States v. Knotts
The D.C. Circuit Court was correct to split from other circuits and hold
that Knotts had a limited scope which did not apply to the facts of Jones’
surveillance.157 There is an admittedly sound rationale behind the idea that the
activities exposed to the public world should not be subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Namely, it is logical to say that when an individual

151. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568.
152. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212,
1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
153. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64.
154. Hutchins, supra note 7, at 1190–91.
155. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 277 tbl.1 (2002) (citing a survey which revealed that
people were more concerned with police camera surveillance on a public street where the tapes
were not destroyed); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 136 (2002) (“People
thus perceive the act of tracking everywhere a person drives in public as meaningfully distinct
from temporarily following a person, an activity which is itself a step removed from simply
noticing the person because he or she is driving out in public.”); Reader Poll on the Growing Use
of GPS by Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html (indicating sixty percent of 3,008 responders
believed that the use of GPS technology to track criminal suspects marks a troubling trend).
156. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
157. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557.
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takes something that otherwise is private and reveals it in public (like their
location), the individual invites the public to gain that knowledge and invites a
certain amount of public scrutiny.158 The level of public scrutiny that the
reasonable person actually invites when they enter the public sphere, however,
is not as high as the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits would like to say it
is.159 While it may include the limited information that the police obtained
from the beeper used in Knotts, it is not likely to include the long-term and
detailed information the police gained from their month long, twenty-four hour
surveillance of Jones via a GPS tracker.160 This is because simply stepping out
of one’s home and onto a public street does not necessarily expose a great
amount of detail about personal life.161 Moreover, the public sphere does offer
some protections, as the dissent in Pineda-Moreno recognized: “You can
preserve your anonymity from prying eyes, even in public, by traveling at
night, through heavy traffic, or in crowds . . . .”162 With the employment of a
GPS device, these protections are gone, as there is no hiding from the “allseeing network” of GPS satellites.163
The D.C. Circuit Court’s recognition that there is a need to distinguish
between long-term and short-term surveillance shows that it better understood
the necessary analysis for deciphering what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy.164 It recognized that the GPS surveillance was a
prolonged search because it was long-term surveillance as opposed to the
limited information the police received from the use of the beeper.165 Other
courts have also pointed to this difference in their analysis on the shortcomings
of Knotts’ limited holding to justify the conclusion that GPS tracking does not
constitute a search.166 An important distinction between the facts in Knotts and

158. Otterberg, supra note 15, at 686.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 675; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556.
161. See Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and Public
Privacy, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1146 (2010) (“When a person steps outside the four walls of her
home, she still expects to control what personal ‘information’ gets conveyed to the public.”).
162. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the
Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and
Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1419–20 (2004) (noting that the physical environment of the
public space can provide substantial opportunity for privacy, such as by merging into a crowd or
by interacting with different groups of people in different contexts).
163. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).
164. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
165. Id.
166. The New York Court of Appeals recently recognized the limited scope of Knotts in its
decision that the prolonged use of GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car constituted a search and
its use without a warrant violated the state constitution. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195,
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in Maynard was that the beeper in Knotts could not perform tracking on its
own, and if no one was close enough to pick up the signal, it was lost
forever.167 In his concurrence in Knotts, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, suggested that the holding in Knotts could potentially
be construed as overly broad.168 Justice Stevens urged that the majority was
not entirely correct in suggesting that the Fourth Amendment did not inhibit
the police from augmenting the “sensory facilities bestowed upon them at
birth” with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.169 He
stated that while the augmentation in Knotts of using a beeper to aid in actual
physical tracking was unobjectionable, “it by no means follows that the use of
electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive
concerns.”170 This language in his concurrence advocated applying Knotts in a
more limited way, especially when the augmentation of police powers could be
considered objectionable, as in the case of twenty-four hour GPS surveillance.
By declining to apply Knotts to Jones’ surveillance, the D.C. Circuit Court
in Maynard protected against the very concern that the Supreme Court deferred
in Knotts.171 The necessary distinction between long-term and short-term
surveillance becomes even more obvious when one looks closely at Knotts.
There, the court articulated that its holding would not permit twenty-four hour
surveillance without judicial supervision and that, “if such dragnet type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there
will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits
principles may be applicable.”172
acknowledged that there may be an important difference in constitutionality
when it comes to a heightened level of surveillance.173 For example, neither
circuit would extend its holding that warrantless GPS tracking does not
constitute a search if the government were to initiate a massive surveillance
campaign.174 In this concession and refusal to apply their holdings to such a
1198–99 (N.Y. 2009). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also suggested the limited holding of
Knotts, stating, “Knotts deliberately left unanswered not only the question of whether the police
conduct that made the monitoring possible violated the Fourth Amendment, but also the question
of how such conduct, if illegal, will be dealt with.” United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1517
(5th Cir. 1984); see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (reaching a
similar, limited scope conclusion).
167. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc). This distinction will be explored in more detail in Part III.B.3.
168. 460 U.S. 276, 288 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 284 (majority opinion).
172. Id.
173. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010).
174. Id. (“We, like the Seventh Circuit, believe that ‘[s]hould [the] government someday
decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough
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situation, they fail to realize that it may not take a “massive surveillance
campaign” to trigger a violation of constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit
pointed to the New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Weaver,175 and that
court’s fear that permitting warrantless GPS tracking would support the
unsupervised intrusion by the police into personal privacy.176 It then quoted
Knotts, saying, “reality hardly suggests abuse.”177 The problem is that reality
is actually beginning to suggest abuse, as evidenced by the warrantless
prolonged surveillance of Jones in the Maynard case. The Ninth Circuit’s
reliance on Knotts for the proposition that there is not modern day abuse is
further illogical because Knotts was decided in 1983, before the use of GPS
tracking devices by the police had begun.178 In fact, in stating that “reality
hardly suggests abuse,” the Knotts Court was quoting a 1978 decision
regarding a search of a newspaper office.179 Searching a newspaper office is a
far cry from the continuous, unwarranted tracking of an individual’s location in
2010.
The Supreme Court has recognized differing degrees of intrusion into
privacy in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.180 By acknowledging
differing degrees of privacy, the Court has recognized that different levels of
justification are necessary in order to protect against constitutional
violations.181 These differing degrees of intrusion into privacy come to light
especially when analyzing the distinction between short-term and long-term
surveillance.182 A higher degree of intrusion into someone’s privacy requires a
higher level of justification, and it logically follows that the limited
information gathered from the beeper in Knotts would not require as high of a
burden of justification as the prolonged surveillance in Maynard.
While an individual may be unconcerned about certain public activities
being viewed in isolation or for a limited period of time, that same person may
feel his or her privacy has been violated when those details are collected and

to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a
search.’” (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007))).
175. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
176. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2.
177. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284).
178. President Reagan first granted civilian access to GPS in 1983. See Otterberg, supra note
15, at 666.
179. 460 U.S. at 283–284 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
180. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30
PACE L. REV. 927, 955 (2010).
181. Id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20, 25 (1968) (recognizing that while the government
interest in investigating reasonably suspicious behavior authorized police to forcibly detain an
individual for a period of time, the temporary detention did not justify the greater intrusion of a
search).
182. Blitz, supra note 162, at 1408–10.
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viewed in the aggregate.183 Such prolonged surveillance and subsequent
aggregation reveals far more details. It may reveal more than many citizens
would be comfortable with revealing, regardless of whether they were
participating in illegal behavior or not,184 and the D.C. Circuit Court correctly
recognized that in Maynard.185 A reasonable person does not expect anyone to
monitor and retain a record of every car ride, route, destination, and how long
he stays at each destination.186 Rather, he expects his movements to remain
“disconnected and anonymous.”187 In sum, exposing one’s actions to the
public may diminish an expectation of privacy, but it does not eliminate that
expectation altogether. The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits failed to make
that distinction.188 The decision in Maynard correctly distinguishes between
the prolonged surveillance of Jones and the short-term and limited beeper
surveillance used in Knotts. For this reason, the D.C. Circuit Court was correct
to hold that Knotts’ limited scope did not apply and that Jones did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a
month.189
2. The Disappearing Subjective Analysis of a Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
In applying the Katz test for a reasonable expectation of privacy, the D.C.
Circuit Court was correct to conclude that Jones had such an expectation in his
movements.190 While the Katz test has both subjective and objective prongs,
the D.C. Circuit Court relied more heavily on the objective prong, with good
reason.191 In the time since Justice Harlan formed the test for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, many courts have come to consider mainly the
objective prong, leaving the subjective expectation of privacy to fall by the
wayside.192 There is strong evidence that even the Supreme Court gives more
credence to the objective reasonableness prong.193 In United States v. White,
the Court articulated that the main consideration for the test is “not what the
privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may
be . . . . Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 1409.
Id. at 1408–10.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
Id. (citation omitted).
Otterberg, supra note 15, at 687.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558, 563.
Id. at 563.
See id. 563–64; Hutchins, supra note 7, at 1190.
Id. at 1191–92.
Id.; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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expectations of privacy are constitutionally ‘justifiable’—what expectations
the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant.”194
It is impractical to heavily rely on the subjective element of this test
because as a practical matter, most criminals will subjectively desire to shield
their wrongdoings from the public eye. Courts should instead focus on what
society overall deems to be a justifiable expectation of privacy rather than
lending too much importance to the subjective expectation of a particular
person. The D.C. Circuit Court’s discussion of “the whole of one’s
movements” and how prolonged GPS tracking can lead to discovery of the
most detailed aspects of a person’s life is in line with the current trend to
consider the objective reasonableness prong more seriously.195 Courts must
mainly analyze what kind of expectations a reasonable person has when
traveling in the public sphere.196 Most reasonable persons would consider the
constant tracking of their movements for a prolonged period and the
subsequent ability to learn such personal details of their everyday life to be a
violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy.
When analyzing the objective prong, it is important to note that the general
availability of GPS devices to the public also does not defeat the objective
societal expectation of privacy. In Kyllo, the Court distinguished between
technology that was generally available to the public and technology that was
available only to the government, such as the thermal imaging device at issue
in that case.197 This distinction, however, is not dispositive in the case of GPS
devices. While useful in Kyllo, the narrow holding of that case regarding
collecting information from inside a home does not define society’s
expectation of privacy when it comes to GPS tracking.198 For example, most
people reasonably expect that when they drive to the store, bystanders may
notice them doing so. Conversely, people generally do not reasonably expect
a bystander to observe all of their actions in the aggregate over the course of a
month. Similarly, regardless of the fact that GPS devices are available for
purchase to the public, most people do not reasonably expect someone to
attach a GPS device to their vehicle and create a detailed log of all of their

194. White, 401 U.S. at 751–52 (plurality opinion).
195. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
196. For one author’s definition of privacy, see Zeronda, supra note 161, at 1146 (quoting
Professor Alan Westin’s widely accepted definition of privacy, as “the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others”).
197. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).
198. See id. at 40 (holding that where “the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore the details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’”).
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activities over the course of a month.199 If one were to place all emphasis on
the distinction of technology available for public use, the results could be
disastrous, as many types of highly intrusive mechanisms which people would
not expect to be in general use are realistically easily available to the public.200
The notion that someone may be tracking individual movements using a
GPS device generally offends society’s expectation of privacy in the public
sphere.201 The likelihood that a bystander will observe all of one’s movements
for a month and the likelihood that someone has attached a GPS device to their
car in order to track all of those movements is slim enough to justify a
reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling in a private vehicle in the
public sphere.202 In order to define a reasonable expectation of privacy and, in
essence, to decide if use of a certain technology offends such an expectation in
a certain case, emphasis should not be placed solely on the availability and use
of that technology in general but on the specific factual circumstances of the
surveillance.203 Society may recognize that GPS devices are readily available
and used frequently, but it does not follow that the norm is for people to expect
such a device to be attached to their car.

199. See Talia E. Neri, Privacy in the Age of Tracking Technology: Why G.P.S. Technology
Should Not Be Used to Track Process Servers, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 209, 247
(2009) (examining society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in public spaces and citing
activities such as staring and stalking as crossing that boundary).
Admittedly, a reasonable person cannot expect complete secrecy of their actions and
words in a public arena, but there is some threshold boundary that we expect other people
to respect when we are in their presence. . . . Essentially, we have a certain expectation
about the level of observation that is acceptable in public.
. . . [T]he person who is on the receiving end of the stare or who is being followed is
placing himself in the public eye, yet societal standards afford a base level of privacy not
to be crossed.
Id.
200. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American
Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 400 (1997) (noting that
it is illogical to rely too heavily on the availability of technology to the public in defining what
constitutes a search because, for example, a map-making camera that costs $22,000 is both highly
intrusive and also generally available to the public).
201. Neri, supra note 199, at 247 (noting that while the GPS does not openly violate our sense
of decency, it may have profound psychological and emotional effects and inhibit our ability to
operate in the public sphere).
202. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
203. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 455, 450 (1989); id. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(finding an inspection made from a helicopter did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment). In her essential concurrence, Justice O’Connor explained, “[i]f the public rarely, if
ever, travels overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point
generally used by the public and Riley cannot be said to have ‘knowingly expose[d]’ his
greenhouse to public view.” Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Moreover, to say that since GPS devices are available for general public
use and, therefore, that unwarranted use by law enforcement of the devices
does not encroach on Fourth Amendment rights is to run the risk of giving law
enforcement a carte blanche when it comes to using technology. Simply
because a device is available to the public for misuse does not mean that courts
should sanction any government use of the technology. Technological
advances in electronic surveillance are invading and posing a great threat to the
privacy of individuals, and the utmost care must be given when defining the
boundaries of society’s reasonable expectation of privacy.204
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that society is coming to
recognize an objective expectation of privacy with regards to warrantless GPS
tracking. Studies have shown growing concern with warrantless GPS tracking
and similar surveillance techniques.205 Such concerns illustrate that society
indeed is coming towards recognizing an expectation of privacy in the public
sphere, because that concern would not be present if they did not believe there
was a privacy expectation in public.206 The dissent in Pineda-Moreno
recognizes this societal interest, aptly stating, “[t]here is something creepy and
un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior.”207 One
author has acknowledged the expansion of society’s expectation of privacy,
saying, “it is also time to consider whether the public-private distinction, as it
has developed over the past century and a half, makes sense in a digital
age.”208 The D.C. Circuit Court recognized the need to reconsider such a
distinction, and was therefore, correct in finding that Jones had a reasonable
objective expectation to privacy which society recognizes as legitimate.
3. The Implications of the Technological Differences Between Knotts’
Beeper and Maynard’s GPS
The technological differences between using a beeper to track a suspect’s
whereabouts and using a GPS device to do the same are substantial and have
significant ramifications on the Fourth Amendment analysis and whether or
not an action constitutes a search. The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts, in
arguing that GPS tracking was simply a substitute for normal police
surveillance, failed to recognize the importance of these ramifications resulting
204. Pomerance, supra note 2, at 277.
205. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 155, at 135–36; Slobogin, supra note 155, at 277 tbl.1;
Reader Poll on the Growing Use of GPS by Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.wa
shingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html.
206. Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND.
L.J. 549, 568 (1990) (noting the concern about police intrusions on privacy in the public sphere).
207. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
208. John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border with Cyberspace,
78 MISS. L.J. 241, 294 (2008).
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from the differences between the two technologies.209 That such an argument
was a large part of their reasoning in holding that GPS tracking did not
constitute a search shows shortsightedness in their Fourth Amendment
analysis.210 In Maynard, the D.C. Circuit Court correctly refrained from
categorizing GPS tracking as a substitute for police surveillance.
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all relied heavily on the
proposition in Knotts that “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.”211 The Ninth
Circuit Court in Pineda-Moreno reasoned, relying on Knotts, that where the
information was gathered by an electronic device and that device was the
substitute for an activity, like the police following the car on the streets, it was
not a search.212 They further stated that since the only information the police
obtained from the tracking device was a log of the locations the car traveled to,
the police could have obtained this by following the car, and that fact also
precluded the court from holding the action was a search.213 To drive home the
point, the Ninth Circuit Court quoted Knotts, saying, “[w]e have never equated
police efficiency with unconstitutionality and decline to do so now.”214
The Garcia court made a similar argument, focusing more on the
technological side.215 It looked at the differences between old technology
(police following a suspect in a car) and new technology (cameras mounted on
lampposts or using satellites to capture images of suspects on land).216 The
court equated GPS with the new technology of mounting cameras on
lampposts and using satellites to take pictures.217 They simply stated that if
what the old technology did was not a search under the Fourth Amendment,
neither was the new technology and thus, using the GPS was not a search.218
In summary, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuit Courts argued that using a
GPS to track a suspect’s location was not a search because it was solely

209. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007).
210. See Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (stating that the holding in Pineda-Moreno takes “quite a leap from what the
Supreme Court actually held Knotts, which is that you have no expectation of privacy as against
police who are conducting visual surveillance”).
211. 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
212. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
213. Id. at 1216–17.
214. Id. at 1216 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284).
215. 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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substituting new technology for what the police could have done in person by
following the suspect in a car.219
The Knotts Court stated that it was acceptable for police to augment their
sensory faculties with science and technology.220 Nevertheless, to extend this
statement to include GPS tracking would be to take too many liberties with the
facts and ignore certain realities that have significant impact on the Fourth
Amendment analysis. According to the Court, on the surface, police efficiency
clearly does not equate with unconstitutional activity.221 However, one cannot
solely rely on that argument from Knotts to justify any and all augmentations
of police efficiency. Of course, just because something is more advanced
technologically does not mean that it is automatically unconstitutional or that
the police will abuse the technology. However, the Court has previously taken
into account the fact that the Fourth Amendment implications might change
when the technology does. For instance, in Kyllo, the Court stated, “[w]hile
the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”222 GPS tracking devices are a prime example of “more
sophisticated systems” that require closer scrutiny in their use.
The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts all relied heavily on Knotts
in deciding that the use of a GPS was not a search, and, as such, it is necessary
to analyze the actual differences between the beeper used in Knotts and GPS
tracking devices, such as the one at issue in Maynard. After that analysis, one
can see that those circuits erred in relying on Knotts to the extent they did. The
Knotts Court predicated their argument on the fact that the technology used
was very primitive,223 as compared to the vastly superior GPS technology that
pinpoints an exact location at any time.224 The beeper device in Knotts was a
battery operated radio transmitter that issued intermittent signals which police
could pick up when they used a radio receiver.225 In contrast, a GPS device
provides continuous, highly accurate, and reliable positioning and timing
information to users, available to police over the Internet.226 The system
functions through satellites that broadcast precise time signals, giving GPS
devices more accurate readings than the signals received from beeper
devices.227 In light of the considerable differences in accuracy between a GPS

219. Id.; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
220. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
221. Id. at 284.
222. 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).
223. 460 U.S. at 284–85
224. See How Accurate is GPS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2011) (noting that this technology is “extremely accurate”).
225. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277–78.
226. Otterberg, supra note 15, at 665.
227. Id.
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device and a beeper, the two cannot be compared on equal grounds with
respect to their use in police surveillance, and the holding regarding beepers in
Knotts cannot, with good conscience, be used to support an analysis that
equates beepers to the highly more accurate GPS devices.228
Another critical distinction between a GPS device and a beeper is that the
GPS functions entirely on its own, whereas the beeper in Knotts required
police to be in the vicinity with a receiver in order to gain the information they
wanted about the suspect’s whereabouts.229 Therefore, when the police
activity at issue is using a GPS device to track a suspect, a court cannot
logically make the argument that police are simply substituting one activity for
another because the GPS does not require police presence to function; rather it
only requires police presence at the time of attachment. Since a GPS is
fundamentally different from a beeper, that makes it even less similar to actual
visual surveillance, and the Knotts analogy is inapplicable.230 This has
incredible implications for the Fourth Amendment analysis and for courts’
ability to rely on Knotts in GPS cases. For this reason, the Maynard court was
correct not to equate the GPS and beeper technology.
The view that using a GPS device is synonymous with police maintaining
visual surveillance or using a beeper also ignores the practical and logistical
difficulties police would have in duplicating the results of the month long,
continuous tracking of a suspect using a GPS. While it may be theoretically
possible for the police to engage in such tracking without using a GPS, it is an
unsustainable position given common limitations on police investigations, such
as budgetary, time, and personnel issues.231 The drain on resources that would
occur should police attempt to duplicate the results of GPS surveillance by
actual visual surveillance would almost necessarily ensure a curtailed visual
surveillance. When surveillance techniques become so extensive that they
cannot realistically be maintained by actual police personnel themselves, then
the argument that police are simply augmenting their natural capabilities
fails.232 GPS allows for prolonged surveillance that provides law enforcement

228. Tarik N. Jallad, Comment, Recent Development, Old Answers to New Questions: GPS
Surveillance and the Unwarranted Need for Warrants, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 358 (2010)
(arguing that differences in GPS technology and beeper technology are similar enough in their
results to justify the same Fourth Amendment analysis, however, “[u]nlike the beeper, GPS
remains accurate even from great distances, both in congested areas and throughout various
weather elements. And the beeper’s location estimation pales in comparison to satellite’s pinpoint
accuracy” (footnotes omitted)).
229. Id.
230. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
231. Gershman, supra note 180, at 951.
232. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that GPS satellites “never sleep, never
blink, never get confused and never lose attention”).
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with a comprehensive, detailed, and lengthy record of one’s movements—a
kind of record virtually impossible to obtain through visual surveillance or
even beeper-attended surveillance, unless police resources were unlimited.233
As a result of these differences, GPS tracking cannot be equated to beeper
technology or to actual police surveillance, and, therefore, the D.C. Circuit
Court was correct to decline to rely on this argument.234
CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit Court properly appreciated the limited holding of United
States v. Knotts and declined to apply it to the situation in Maynard because,
among other reasons, there is a significant difference between short-term
surveillance and prolonged surveillance when defining a reasonable
expectation of privacy.235 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit Court appropriately
abstained from engaging in a “substituting activities” argument that both the
Ninth and Seventh Circuit Courts relied on when they held that the
unwarranted use of GPS tracking devices was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.236 As these activities are not comparable because of the practical
realities of police capabilities and the advanced technology of GPS devices,
they cannot be given the same status within the Fourth Amendment search
analysis.237 Indeed, using a GPS device without a warrant to track a suspect’s
movements twenty-four hours a day over the course of a month violates one’s
reasonable expectation of privacy and should be defined as a search within the
Fourth Amendment, thus requiring law enforcement officials to obtain a
warrant before such an investigation is initiated.
The issue of modern technology’s impact on the Fourth Amendment
presents courts with a difficult challenge, and the number of conflicts resulting
will surely grow in the coming years as technology continues to develop as an
integral part of life, crime, and crime prevention. It will become increasingly
important for courts to ensure law enforcement officials have the continued
ability to protect the community against crime, while also recognizing and
protecting the constitutional rights the Fourth Amendment is meant to bestow
upon citizens. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took a step in the right
direction on August 6, 2010, in holding that the unwarranted use of a GPS
device to track a suspect’s movements over the course of a month was a search

233. Otterberg, supra note 15, at 696.
234. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
235. Id. at 558.
236. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
237. Gershman, supra note 180, at 951.
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, violated the
suspect’s constitutional rights.238
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